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Compensation, Fairness, and the Costs of
Accidents- Should Pennsylvania's
Legislature Modify or Abrogate the Rule
of Joint and Several Liability Among
Concurrently Negligent Tortfeasors?
"Until it does, alas, there will be few Memorial Day parades
sponsored by communities such as Harrisville."'
I. Introduction
The rule of joint and several liability, often referred to as the
"deep pockets" theory,2 has been the subject of much controversy.
Essentially, the rule allows a successful plaintiff to collect his entire
damage award from any one defendant when two or more defend-
ants have acted negligently, either in concert or independently, to
cause one indivisible injury.8 This is true even when responsibility for
the loss is apportioned among the parties to the accident under the
theory of comparative negligence. A tortfeasor who pays more than
his proportionate share of the award may seek contribution from his
fellow judgment debtors, but he bears the risk that they will be una-
ble to pay."
Plaintiffs recovering judgments under joint and several liability
routinely seek recovery first, and usually entirely, from that
tortfeasor with the greatest assets. The rule of joint and several lia-
bility thus has the effect of singling out government entities, indus-
tries, and professionals. These are the so-called "deep pockets" that
are most likely to have the resources to satisfy a victim's damage
award.
I. Elder v. Orluck, - Pa. 515 A.2d 517, 526 (1986) (Flaherty, J., con-
curring) (discussed infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text).
2. The "deep pockets" theory is manifested not only in the rule of joint and several
liability, but also in theories of liability such as respondeat superior, enterprise liability, and
strict products liability. The theory is that those most able to pay a damage award without
suffering serious social or economic dislocation should be compelled to do so. See G. CALA-
BRESI. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 40 (1970); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,
474 (1985).
3. I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 711 (1956); V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.3, at 258 (1986).
4. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at
351 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
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Advocates of tort reform identify the joint and several liability
rule as one of the aspects of the civil justice system that should be
changed in order to remedy the insurance crisis.5 Whether or not one
believes that tort reform will have an effect on the insurance crisis,
the doctrine of joint and several liability deserves some critical atten-
tion from the Pennsylvania General Assembly. First, the doctrine op-
erates within Pennsylvania's comparative negligence system to create
a likelihood of unfair results to minimally culpable defendants who
may be compelled to pay the entire recovery to more culpable plain-
tiffs. Second, while changing the rule of joint and several liability
would not cure the insurance crisis, it should be recognized that a
rule that encourages suits against minimally culpable "deep pocket"
defendants and then compels payment by such defendants of awards
that are excessive in relation to their relative fault may tend to con-
tribute to problems of liability insurance affordability and availabil-
ity. Quite apart from this obvious effect on insurance pricing, joint
and several liability may tend to frustrate desired insurance pricing
5. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 61.
The Insurance Committee of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives disagrees with the
proposition that tort reform will remedy the insurance crisis. In a report issued in September
1986, the Committee made the following comments:
The present "crisis" of unavailability and unaffordability [of liability insur-
ance] is not caused by the civil justice system but by the unrestrained price
cutting which occurred in the late 1970's and early 1980's, which created artifi-
cially low prices when the insurance industry attempted to obtain as much new
business as possible in order to invest premium income at the extremely high
investment yields which existed [at] that time...
. . . [At the hearings held by the Committee] [t]here was no convincing
evidence presented which indicated that making the changes in the civil justice
system which have been proposed by the proponents of "tort reform", will solve
the current problems of unavailability and affordability of liability insurance or
prevent a similar "crisis" in the future. Not one witness, under direct question-
ing, would predict the effect tort reform would have on either premium rates or
insurance availability. Further, not a single actuarial study was presented to the
committee showing either the effects of existing tort reforms or projecting the
effects of the enactment of any additional changes in the Civil Justice System.
REPORT OF THE INSURANCE COMMITTEE, PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 170th
General Assembly, 1986 Sess., LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS IN PENNSYLVANIA, Conclusions
and Recommendations [hereinafter INSURANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
If one believes that incremental tort reform is appropriate only if it can be guaranteed as
a complete cure for the liability insurance crisis, the conclusion must be that such tort reform
is not appropriate. A complete overhaul of the accident law system, such as that undertaken in
New Zealand, where a comprehensive social insurance system replaced tort law in accident
cases, could certainly achieve such a cure. See infra note 140. Such a radical change, however,
is not politically feasible. If, on the other hand, one recognizes that certain tort reform mea-
sures conceivably could have a desirable effect upon insurance rates over time, and if in addi-
tion one is receptive to the modest suggestion that present tort law rules may not reflect a
perfect balance of our society's goals in the field of accident law, then a critical look at these
rules is certainly appropriate, and change may indeed be warranted. See infra notes 130-70
and accompanying text.
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effects on economically efficient accident cost reduction.6
This Comment will trace the development of the joint and sev-
eral liability rule and examine its function within Pennsylvania's pre-
sent system of comparative negligence. The rule will be compared to
alternatives adopted in other states and to the recent proposals in the
Pennsylvania General Assembly. The analysis will focus upon how
each rule functions to balance competing goals within our system of
comparative negligence, with a view toward answering two ultimate
questions: Should Pennsylvania change its rule of joint and several
liability, and, if so, what change is desirable?
II. The Elder Case-Modified Comparative Negligence and the
Aggregate Rule
The recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Elder v.
Orluck7 is a poignant comment on the joint and several liability doc-
trine. On Memorial Day 1977, the Borough of Harrisville, with the
permission of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, closed
a section of Route 8, a state highway, in order to conduct a parade.
As a result, traffic was slowed on the stretch of Route 8 to the north
of the Borough. George Elder was driving south on Route 8 toward
Harrisville when, just as he was approaching the Harrisville Borough
limits, he saw a truck traveling directly ahead of him slow abnor-
mally as it reached the crest of a hill. Elder, in response, began to
slow down as he neared the hill's crest. As he cleared the hill, his
vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Adam Orluck.
Elder sustained serious personal injuries for which he brought suit.
Orluck, the original defendant, joined the Borough of Harrisville as
an additional defendant, alleging that Harrisville was negligent in
6. See infra notes 130-70 and accompanying text. The doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility applies to defendants held strictly liable for injuries caused by defective products as well
as to defendants held liable for negligence. See, e.g., Capuano v. Echo Bicycle Co., 27 Pa. D.
& C.3d 524 (1982); Stewart v. Uniroyal, Inc. No. 2, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 206 (1975) affid, 238
Pa. Super. 726, 356 A.2d 821 (1976) (per curiam). This comment, however, focuses only upon
how the joint and several liability rule functions within Pennsylvania's system of comparative
negligence. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, it is probable
that the court would construe the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1986), to be inapplicable to cases involving strict products liabil-
ity. See Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 578 F. Supp. 1429 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985). The topic of joint and
several liability of concurrent tortfeasors held liable on a theory of strict products liability is,
therefore, outside the scope of this comment. For an excellent discussion of the application of
comparative negligence principles to products liability, see Leff & Pinto, Comparative Negli-
gence in Strict Products Liability: The Courts Render the Final Judgment, 89 DICK. L. REV.
915 (1985).
7. - Pa. -, 515 A.2d 517 (1986), affid, 334 Pa. Super. 329, 483 A.2d 474.
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failing to warn oncoming traffic of the obstruction, in failing to de-
tour traffic around the parade, and in failing to direct traffic in order
to avoid danger.'
At trial, Elder's damages were found to be $250,000. The jury
apportioned responsibility among the parties to the suit as follows:
Elder (plaintiff)-twenty-five percent; Orluck (defendant #1)-sixty
percent; and Harrisville (defendant #2)-fifteen percent. Harrisville
filed a motion to mold the verdict to deny Elder the right to recover
from Harrisville on the grounds that he was found to bear greater
responsibility for the accident than was the Borough. This proposi-
tion is arguable under the language of the Comparative Negligence
Act (CNA), 9 which established a rule of "modified" comparative
negligence in Pennsylvania.' 0 The trial court denied the motion. On
appeal, the superior court affirmed the trial court's ruling, construing
the CNA to hold that a plaintiff is barred from recovery only when
his causal negligence is greater than the combined causal negligence
8. Id. at 518; see also Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa. Super. 329, 335-37, 483 A.2d 474, 477-
78 (1984).
9. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982).
This statute provides as follows:
(a) General rule.-In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plain-
tiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the
causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.-Where recovery is al-
lowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that
proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the
amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to
all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the
full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plain-
tiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more
than his percentage share may seek contribution.
Id. (emphasis added). Harrisville argued that the emphasized language in the second para-
graph quoted above indicated a legislative intention that a plaintiff's negligence should be com-
pared to that of an individual defendant in order to determine whether the plaintiff was barred
from recovering against that defendant in suits involving multiple defendants. Harrisville also
argued that if the legislature had intended a plaintiff's negligence to be compared to the aggre-
gate negligence of multiple defendants to determine whether the plaintiff is barred from all
recovery, this intention would have been expressed more clearly. The supreme court rejected
this argument, relying on the language emphasized in the first paragraph quoted above to hold
that a plaintiff's negligence bars his recovery only when it is greater than the combined negli-
gence of all defendants. The legislature's use of the plural "defendants" was dispositive of the
statutory construction issue. Elder, - Pa. at _ ; 515 A.2d at 518-21.
10. There are three types of comparative negligence - "pure," "modified," and "slight-
gross." Only Nebraska and South Dakota apply the "slight-gross" system. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-21,185 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979). For a discussion of
"pure" and "modified" systems of comparative negligence see infra notes 55-62 and accompa-
nying text.
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of all the defendants. The court noted that the individual comparison
approach urged by Harrisville would frustrate the policy favoring
compensation of contributorily negligent plaintiffs that the CNA was
enacted to promote. Under the individual comparison approach, a
plaintiff could be only ten percent negligent and yet be wholly barred
from recovery if he sued ten defendants who were each found to be
nine percent negligent. The goal of compensation, the court rea-
soned, necessitates the combined comparison approach." This ap-
proach to comparison under modified comparative negligence is
known as the "aggregate rule."'" On September 25, 1986, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling.13
Because the CNA expressly provides for joint and several liabil-
ity, 14 the Supreme Court's ruling meant not only that Harrisville was
liable to Elder, but also that Harrisville was liable to Elder for the
entire award he was entitled to recover, $187,500.1' Under the
CNA, Harrisville would have a right to contribution from Orluck in
the amount of $150,000,16 but if Orluck is unable to pay the amount,
Harrisville must bear the deficit. The Elder decision means that even
when one of several defendants is found to be less negligent than the
plaintiff in a particular case, that defendant may be called upon to
pay the plaintiff's entire award, so long as the plaintiff's negligence is
not greater than that of all defendants in the aggregate. Thus, in
theory, a fifty percent responsible plaintiff could collect his entire
award from a one percent negligent defendant, who would then bear
the risk that the other defendant in the case would turn out to be
judgment-proof. Justice Flaherty, who filed a concurring opinion,
joined by Justices Hutchinson and Zappala, recognized that such a
rule is manifestly inequitable. 17 Justice Flaherty noted that the
courts of Pennsylvania are constrained from reaching any other re-
sult by the unequivocal language of the CNA."8 Justice Larson, who
II. See Eider, 334 Pa. Super. 329, 346-58, 483 A.2d 474, 483-89.
12. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
13. Elder, - Pa. -, 515 A.2d 517 (1986).
14. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982). The pertinent language
provides that "[t]he plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any
defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery." Id.
15. This amount represents the damages found by the jury, $250,000, reduced by the
proportion of plaintiff's responsibility, 25%. Thus, $250,000 - .25 ($250,000) = $187,500.
16. The CNA provides that "la]ny defendant who is ...compelled to pay more than
his percentage share may seek contribution." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon
1982).
17. See Elder v. Orluck, - Pa. 515 A.2d 517, 526 (1986) (Flaherty, J.,
concurring).
18. Id. (Flaherty, J., concurring). Because the hands of the courts are tied on this issue,
Justice Flaherty called upon Pennsylvania's General Assembly to take action. Id.
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announced the judgment of the court, wrote in dicta that "any un-
fairness that results when a tortfeasor cannot be made to pay his
proportionate share of the damages is a product of the joint and sev-
eral liability doctrine."19
The Elder decision comes at a time when the crisis of af-
fordability and availability of liability insurance has focused atten-
tion on the civil justice system. The joint and several liability doc-
trine is particularly troublesome to municipalities such as
Harrisville, which, along with other "deep pockets" such as indus-
tries and professionals, bear the risk of disproportionate loss when
they are sued with parties less capable of satisfying a plaintiff's dam-
age award. If any theory of liability can be conceived against "deep
pockets" in a given accident situation, plaintiffs are well advised to
join such parties as additional defendants in order to guarantee that
there will be a solvent judgment debtor.20 As a result of this effect of
the joint and several liability rule, "deep pockets" such as municipal-
ities are bad risks from the standpoint of insurers.21
Advocates of tort reform support legislation which would limit a
defendant's liability to that portion of a plaintiff's loss corresponding
to the defendant's percentage of negligence. In response to the call
for reform, Pennsylvania legislators have introduced several bills that
would affect the doctrine of joint and several liability.22 The decision
of whether to change the joint and several liability rule should rest
upon a firm understanding of its historical development and how it
functions in the contemporary context of Pennsylvania's comparative
negligence system.
III. Joint and Several Liability-Historical Development and Con-
temporary Context
A. Development of Joint and Several Liability
Pennsylvania has recognized joint and several liability among
joint tortfeasors for over a century.2 The rule originated in England,
born through the evolution of procedural rules of joinder and the
19. Id. at 525.
20. Thus, joint and several liability means not only that "deep pocket" defendants will
be liable for larger sums than under a system that limits liability to a proportionate share of an
award, but also that they may tend to be sued more often than under a system that limits the
liability of minimally culpable parties.
21. See Insurance crisis solution urged-demand action, chamber chief tells business-
men, Harrisburg Patriot-News, June 4, 1986, at B2, col. 4.
22. See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
23. See Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa. 128 (1860).
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conjunction of these rules with the substantive rules of causation. 2'
The early common law rules of joinder were extremely strict. 25 Join-
der was permitted only in cases of concerted action, when a mutual
agency relationship might be found between tortfeasors. When de-
fendants did not act in concert, the English courts refused to allow
them to be joined as defendants in the same action, even though
their acts combined to cause a single, indivisible injury to the plain-
tiff.26 More liberal joinder rules gradually were adopted in American
courts, most notably by the Field Code of Procedure in New York
and similar codes in other states,27 the plaintiff was permitted,
though not required, to join in a single action tortfeasors who inde-
pendently were liable to him for his entire injury, even though there
was no concert of action or other relationship giving rise to joint
responsibility.28
The effect of this evolution of procedural law was that a plain-
tiff could, in one action, recover a joint and several judgment against
each tortfeasor whose tortious conduct was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's entire injury.2 9 Once the plaintiff obtained the joint and
several judgment, he could elect to execute against one judgment
debtor or any combination of them, with recovery limited by the rule
that only one satisfaction for the loss would be allowed."0
The substantive aspect of the rule of joint and several liability,
which holds each joint tortfeasor5 ' liable for the plaintiff's entire
24. PROSSER, supra note 4, §§ 47, 51, at 324-25, 345.
25. Id. § 47, at 324-25.
26. Id. For an early discussion of this rule as it was applied in Pennsylvania, see Bard v.
Yohn, 26 Pa. 482 (1856) (holding that without concert there is no joint liability).
27. The joinder provisions in these codes were framed to permit "the complete settle-
ment of all questions connected with a transaction in a single suit." PROSSER, supra note 4, §
47, at 325. Present Pennsylvania procedural provisions allow a plaintiff to join as defendants
persons against whom he asserts any right to relief jointly, severally, sepa-
rately or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences if any common question of
law or fact affecting the liability of all such persons will arise in the action.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2229(b).
28. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 47 at 325-27. In Pennsylvania, the rule in Bard v. Yohn,
26 Pa. 482 (1856), barring joint suit of concurrent tortfeasors, had given way to established
rules of liberal joinder by the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century. See supra note
26. See also Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 285 Pa. 229, 132 A. 124 (1926); Smith v. Reading
Transit & Light Co., 282 Pa. 511, 128 A. 439 (1925); Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa. 128
(1860).
29. Comment, Abrogation of Joint and Several Liability: Should Missouri Be Next in
Line?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 72, 74 (1983) (authored by Linda K. Knight).
30. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 48, at 330.
31, The term "joint tort" has been defined in a variety of ways. Dean Prosser, attempt-
ing to derive a pattern of consistency among the American cases involving multiple tortfeasors,
wrote:
[It] would seem to be, that a tort is "joint", in the sense which the Ameri-
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award, is a manifestation of the law of causation, which requires
that a tortfeasor be liable for the entire injury of which his tortious
conduct was a substantial cause. 2 In an action involving a single
defendant, liability for the plaintiff's entire compensable loss can be
imposed upon the defendant if it is shown that his conduct was "a
material element and a substantial factor" in the injury's causa-
tion.8" The conjunction of this substantive rule with liberal joinder
rules has resulted in the present rule of joint and several liability.34
An evaluation of the historical and theoretical foundations of the
rule, as outlined above, suggests that it made fine sense-within a
system that did not recognize principles of apportionment of loss
through comparative responsibility.
B. Allocation of Loss and the Advent of Comparative
Responsibility
The early common law of torts concerned itself with allocation
of loss primarily between the tortfeasor and the victim; if liability
was found, loss was allocated to the tortfeasor; if not, the loss was
can courts have given to the word, when no logical basis can be found for appor-
tionment of the damages between the defendants. The question is whether, upon
the facts, it is possible to say that each defendant is responsible for a separate
portion of the loss sustained. The distinction is one between injuries which are
capable of being divided, and injuries which are not. If two defendants, strug-
gling for a single gun, succeed in shooting the plaintiff, there is no reasonable
basis for dividing the injury, and the tort is joint. If they shoot him indepen-
dently, with separate guns, and he dies, the tort is still joint, for death cannot be
apportioned. If they merely inflict separate wounds, and he survives, a basis for
division exists, no matter how difficult the proof may be, and the torts are sev-
eral. If two defendants each pollute a stream with oil, it is possible to say that
each has interfered to a separate extent with plaintiff's rights in the water, and
to attempt some rough apportionment of the damages; it is not possible if the oil
is ignited, and burns the plaintiff's barn.
See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 442 (1937). By this
definition, "joint tortfeasors" are "defendants whose tortious conduct has made a substantial
contribution to the cause of a single, indivisible injury." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 16.3,
at 257.
32. PROSSER, supra note 4, §§ 41, 47, at 268, 328.
33. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 41, at 267. The "substantial factor" test of the factual
question of whether a defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury was formulated to meet
situations in which the traditional "sine qua non" or "but for" test of cause in fact would have
absolved blameworthy parties from liability and denied victims compensation. The "but for"
test held that if the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's blame-
worthy conduct, then this conduct was the "cause in fact" of the plaintiff's injury. Situations
arise, however, in which concurrent events, each of which would have brought about a particu-
lar harm, combine to cause injury. Neither can be said to have been a sine qua non, yet justice
demands that blameworthy injurers compensate their victims; hence, the "substantial factor"
rule of cause in fact developed. Id. at 266-67.
34. Thus, more or less by accident, a rule that possesses potent functional implications in
the context of our system of loss allocation through comparative negligence came into being.
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left where it lay, upon the injured victim.3 5 In cases involving multi-
ple tortfeasors, another question of loss allocation arises. Should the
loss, once allocated to the defendants on the basis of joint and sev-
eral liability, be further distributed between or among them? The
general American rule had been that there was no right to contribu-
tion, once a particular judgment debtor had satisfied the joint obliga-
tion.36 The rule against contribution had its origin in the English
case of Merryweather v. Nixan,7 which involved a joint judgment
for conversion entered against two defendants who had acted in con-
cert.88 One defendant sought contribution from the other, on the the-
ory that the first had paid money "for the use" of the other, that is,
that he had satisfied a duty owed by both as joint obligors.39 Contri-
bution was denied because the parties had acted intentionally and in
concert and because, in the eyes of the law, the claim for contribu-
tion rested upon what was entirely the plaintiff's own deliberate
wrong.'0 Later cases held that the rule against contribution did not
apply in cases of vicarious liability, negligence, accident, mistake, or
other unintentional breaches of law.41 While the earliest American
cases applied the rule only in cases of willful misconduct, as the rules
of joinder become more liberal, allowing a joint suit against defend-
ants who had merely caused the same damage,42 the majority of
American courts adopted a general rule against contribution even in
cases in which independent but concurrent negligence had contrib-
uted to a single result.
43
Initially, Pennsylvania followed this general rule against contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors." In 1928, however, the Pennsylvania
35. See infra note 98.
36. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 337; see generally Gregory, Contribution Among
Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wisc. L. REV. 365 (discussing the desirability of con-
tribution between joint tortfeasors); James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Prag-
matic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1941).
37. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799); see Note, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged for Negligence - Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1898) (authored
by Theodore W. Reath).
38. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 336.
39. See id.
40. Id. "It was believed that since contribution was an equitable concept, the equitable
rule of 'clean hands' would protect the non-paying tortfeasor from being hauled into court by
an intentional tortfeasor who had discharged the communal obligation." Comment, Loss Allo-
cation in Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence System: Is it "'Fair"?, 91 DICK. L. REV. 241
(1986) (authored by Laurie G. Israel).
41. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 337.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, 100 A. 124 (1917); Oakdale Borough v.
Gamble, 201 Pa. 289, 50 A. 971 (1902); Turton v. Powelton Elect. Co., 185 Pa. 406, 39 A.
1053 (1898); but see Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870).
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Supreme Court limited the rule to allow contribution except when
liability was based upon a willful wrong, in effect adopting the En-
glish rule."5 In 1951, Pennsylvania enacted the Pennsylvania Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act (PaCATA),' which provides for pro
rata allocation of loss among joint tortfeasors. The PaCATA was
based on the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 7 which included an optional section providing for
allocation of loss among joint tortfeasors by reference to their rela-
tive fault. Pennsylvania instead chose the "pro rata" or "equal divi-
sion" rule. Thus, the Commonwealth's approach to the law of acci-
dents began to recognize principles of loss apportionment among
parties to an injury-causing event; at this stage, however, Pennsylva-
nia was not prepared to apportion accident losses on the basis of
comparative responsibility, either between tortfeasors or among all
parties to the accident.48
During the twentieth century, notions of comparative responsi-
bility have become predominant in American tort law, as evidenced
by the nearly universal adoption of some form of comparative negli-
gence among the American states."9 By early 1985, comparative neg-
ligence had replaced contributory negligence as a complete defense
in at least forty-four states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.5"
The contributory negligence rule, which originated in England in the
case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 1 held that a plaintiff was barred
from recovery if his own negligent conduct contributed to the causa-
tion of his injury. While contributory negligence was long the major-
ity rule in America, it came to be viewed as being somewhat harsh
in that it prevented injured parties from receiving any compensation
for their injuries, even when their own contribution to a mishap was
slight in comparison to the contribution of other parties at fault.
45. Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928).
46. Act of July 19, 1951, 1950-51 Pa. Laws 1130. The current version of the Act is
codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8321 (Purdon 1982).
47. UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1-12, 12 U.L.A. 57-59 (1975).
48. In 1943, a bill proposing the adoption of comparative negligence was introduced in
the Pennsylvania General Assembly. The bill met with failure. H.B. 604, 135th Gen. Assem-
bly, 1942 Sess., I Pa. Leg. J. 725 (1943); see also Note, Comparative Negligence in Pennsyl-
vania?, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 276 (1943) (authored by Arthur R. Harris).
49. "The term 'comparative negligence' might be used to describe any system of law
that by some method and in some situations apportions costs of an accident, at least in part, on
the basis of the relative fault of the responsible parties." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, 1 2.11, at
29.
50. Id. § 1.1, at 3.
51. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). The defense of contributory negligence was erroneously
characterized as "a rule from time immemorial" that was "not likely to be changed in all time
to come." See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149 (1854).
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Strictly applied, the contributory negligence rule functioned to make
loss allocation an either-or proposition: either the defendant was lia-
ble, and bore the burden of all compensable loss, or the plaintiff bore
the entire loss because of his contributory negligence. In response to
the perceived harshness of this rule, the courts developed doctrines
such as "last clear chance"52 and "defendant's recklessness"5  to
limit the rule. Also, when the issue of a plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was sent to a jury, the jury often would not follow the instruc-
tion regarding the rule, but instead would apply a comparative negli-
gence approach sub silentio by reducing the recovery that the
negligent plaintiff would have recovered had he been wholly innocent
of fault. 54
A trend slowly developed toward the replacement of the harsh
contributory negligence rule with comparative negligence, either
through legislation or judicial decision."5 Several types of compara-
tive negligence were eventually adopted by the various states. The
most common are pure comparative negligence and modified com-
parative negligence. "Pure" comparative negligence completely abol-
ishes the rule that a plaintiff is barred from recovery by his contribu-
tory fault. Under this approach, the plaintiff's percentage of
responsibility reduces the amount of damages he will be permitted to
recover from the defendant or defendants. Thus, if plaintiff is ninety-
eight percent negligent and damages are found to be one hundred
dollars, plaintiff can recover two dollars.56 The "pure" system of
comparative negligence is the most common rule adopted by judicial
decision. 7 "Modified" comparative negligence, which retains a "bar
52. Under this rule, if the defendant has the "last clear chance" to avoid the injury,
plaintiff's contributory fault will not bar his recovery. The most often-stated explanation for
this rule is that if the defendant has the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's
negligence is not a "proximate cause" of the result. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 66, at 463.
53. Reckless behavior differs from ordinary negligence in kind as well as degree; it is a
state of mind more akin to intent than inadvertence. Thus, the general rule developed that the
plaintiff's contributory negligence did not bar recovery when the defendant's conduct was
found to be reckless. If plaintiff's conduct was reckless, however, it would bar his action
against a reckless defendant. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 65, at 462. Prosser suggests that
this doctrine may be viewed as a form of comparative fault. id.
54. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 1.2(B), at 7.
55. See id. §§ 1.4, 1.5, at 10, 15.
56. If, in such a situation, two defendants are equally at fault and the rule of joint and
several liability is applied, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover up to two dollars from
either one, his aggregate recovery being limited to two dollars. Once a defendant paid more
than his percentage share, he would have a right to contribution from the other. Such a system
provides for the complete apportionment of loss among parties to the accident, on the basis of
comparative responsibility. Note, however, that if one defendant is insolvent, the other will
bear disproportionate loss. Prosser has noted that "pure" comparative negligence is "probably
the simplest method of allocating damages." See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 67, at 471-72.
57. Id. at 472.
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to recovery" feature, has been the rule most frequently adopted by
legislation. 8 There are two common types of modified comparative
negligence, referred to by Prosser as the "equal fault bar" and the
"greater fault bar." 59 Under the former, a plaintiff is barred from
recovery if his fault is found to be equal to, or greater than, that of
the defendant; under the latter, the plaintiffs recovery is barred only
if his fault is greater than that of the defendant.60 A significant ques-
tion arises under such systems when there are multiple defendants in
a single suit: Should the plaintiffs negligence be compared to that of
individual defendants or to that of the entire group? Some states
apply the former approach, and when the plaintiffs negligence ex-
ceeds that of a particular defendant, recovery against that defendant
is barred.61 Other jurisdictions compare the plaintiffs negligence to
the aggregate negligence of all defendants and bar the plaintiff's re-
covery against all defendants when his negligence is equal to (equal
fault bar) or greater than (greater fault bar) the aggregate.6" Penn-
sylvania adopted a modified "greater fault bar" comparative negli-
gence system with the enactment of the CNA on July 9, 1976.63
As Elder v. Orluck established, the "aggregate rule" applies in
the Pennsylvania system. Furthermore, the CNA has repealed the
PaCATA insofar as the latter provides for pro rata contribution in
negligence cases, replacing the equal contribution rule with a system
of contribution among joint tortfeasors based upon comparative re-
sponsibility.6 Thus, the law of negligence in Pennsylvania has
58. Id. at 473.
59. Id.
60. The "modified" comparative negligence systems ease the harsh effects of the contrib-
utory negligence rule somewhat. They do, however, retain the bar to the plaintiff's recovery
when his or her fault exceeds a specific level in relation to that of the defendants. The very fact
that a particular legislature has adopted such a modified approach suggests that the policy
favoring compensation of accident victims has been tempered with concerns arising from no-
tions of fairness. That is, the legislature has concluded that when, for the most part, victims
have brought injury upon themselves, they should not be permitted to shift their losses to other
parties to the accident. Under modified comparative negligence, loss that is disproportionate to
relative fault is deemed to be fairly allocated to plaintiffs in such circumstances. Thus, the
policy favoring compensation is balanced against more traditional concepts of corrective justice
that underly the law of torts. See infra text accompanying notes 130-70.
61. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 67, at 473. The individual comparison approach cre-
ates an incentive for defendants to join as many nominal defendants as possible in hopes of
avoiding liability altogether and, conversely, it operates to discourage plaintiffs from joining all
the potential defendants. Id.
62. Id. Pennsylvania has firmly adopted the "aggregate rule." See Elder v. Orluck, -
Pa...., 515 A.2d 517 (1986) (discussed supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text).
63. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1985). For an overview of
Pennsylvania's system of comparative negligence and the many issues arising thereunder, see
Comment, Loss Allocation in Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence System: Is it "Fair"?,
91 DIcK. L. REV. 241 (1986) (authored by Laurie G. Israel).
64. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1985). The CNA's
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evolved from the early common law system that in essence repre-
sented an either-or loss allocation system as between tortfeasor and
victim, a system in which the rule of joint and several liability had
its roots, to a system recognizing allocation of accident losses among
all parties through comparative fault and contribution. Significantly,
both the PaCATA and the CNA expressly retain the rule of joint
and several liability.6"
C. Joint and Several Liability in Systems of Comparative
Fault-How the Rule has Fared
While Pennsylvania has retained the rule of joint and several
liability through express statutory language, apparently without any
discussion," the question of whether the rule is theoretically compat-
ible with a system of comparative fault, and ultimately whether the
rule is desirable within such a system, has been considered in other
jurisdictions. There is a theoretical conflict between joint and several
liability, which initially assigns to a joint defendant liability that is
not in proportion to his fault, and comparative negligence, which ap-
portions responsibility according to the relative fault of all parties to
the injury-causing event or to the subsequent litigation.67 To be sure,
contribution among joint defendants based upon comparative fault
attempts to correct this situation, but if one or more of the defend-
ants is insolvent or otherwise escapes execution, contribution fails in
this attempt. In effect, joint and several liability puts a joint
tortfeasor at risk of bearing a loss that is out of proportion to the
relative fault attributed to him by the trier of fact."
contribution provisions apply only between defendants held liable on a theory of negligence
and not strict liability. See Capuano v. Echo Bicycle Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.3d 524 (1982).
65. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7102(b), 8322 (Purdon 1982).
66. There is no indication that the issue of joint and several liability was considered
during legislative debates attending the passage of the CNA. See I Pa. Legis. J. 1703-07
(Senate 1976).
67. While Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7102 (Purdon 1982) provides for comparison of a plaintiffs fault with that of the defendant or
defendants, suggesting that accident losses are to be apportioned among litigants, other juris-
dictions provide that the fault of all parties to the injury-causing event is to be compared. See,
e.g., Pieringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1983) (holding that, under Wiscon-
sin's system of comparative negligence, the fault of a party absent to the litigation should be
considered when apportioning liability); see also infra note 90.
68. It should be recognized that under a modified comparative negligence system, a
plaintiff bears a similar risk. If the plaintiff's fault reaches the threshold that either wholly
bars his recovery, as under the aggregate rule (in force in Pennsylvania), or bars his recovery
against a particular tortfeasor under the individual comparison approach, the plaintiff will bear
a loss that is not in direct proportion to the relative fault attributed to him by the trier of fact.
In a system in which the aggregate rule is observed, however, the apparent reciprocity is illu-
sory. With respect to the plaintiff, the risk borne is related to his degree of fault. One can
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Loss allocation by reference to relative fault, however, is not the
only purpose of a comparative negligence approach. Comparative
negligence systems have at least two separate, but interdependent
goals: (1) insuring fair but adequate compensation to injured vic-
tims; and (2) providing fair allocation of responsibility among
wrongdoers. 69 The first of these purposes relates to the abandonment
of the contributory negligence defense, which traditionally operated
as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery. Comparative negligence
was adopted to ease the harshness of this rule.7" "Fairness" was
maintained by (1) diminishing the plaintiff's recovery when he or she
contributed to the injury, and additionally, in modified systems, by
(2) barring the plaintiff's recovery if his or her relative fault passed a
specific threshold. 7 1 Through comparative negligence, therefore, the
policy favoring compensation of victims was effectuated to the de-
gree desired by each particular jurisdiction. Additionally, compara-
tive negligence systems provided for allocation of loss among defend-
ants by reference to their relative degree of fault. While joint and
several liability may conflict with a policy of allocating accident loss
by reference to relative fault, it is conducive to a policy of providing
a greater likelihood that injured victims will be compensated.
The states have dealt with the problems of theory and policy
attending the application of the joint and several liability rule within
systems of comparative negligence in a variety of ways. Some have
retained the joint and several liability rule in its traditional form.
Others have wholly abrogated the rule, limiting liability of defend-
ants to a portion of damages corresponding to their relative fault.
Still other jurisdictions have adopted modified forms of the rule. The
choice ultimately depends on how a particular jurisdiction defines
and values the goals of compensation and fairness.
1. Retention of Joint and Several Liability.-Most of the
states that have adopted comparative negligence have retained the
conclude that since the plaintiff is for the most part responsible for his own loss, he should not
be permitted to shift that loss to another. The risk that a defendant will bear a loss that is
excessive with respect to his or her proportion of fault is allocated without reference to his or
her relative fault. Cf. McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because
of Comparative Negligence-A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV. I, 10 (1979) (discussing
the difference between systems of pure and modified comparative negligence as it bears upon
the question of whether joint and several liability should be retained).
69. Id. at I].
70. See supra text accompanying note 55.
71. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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rule of joint and several liability in its traditional form.72 The argu-
ments advanced for retention of the rule generally have been based
upon both its historical foundation in the law of causation and the
policy favoring full compensation of accident victims.
73
The California Supreme Court decision in American Motorcy-
cle Association v. Superior Court 4 is an example of this line of rea-
soning. Three years before the American Motorcycle decision, Cali-
fornia had adopted the "pure" form of comparative negligence by
judicial decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California.7 5 In Ameri-
can Motorcycle, the American Motorcycle Association (AMA), af-
ter being sued as a joint tortfeasor on a theory of negligence, as-
serted a cause of action against cross-defendants
based on an implicit assumption that the Li decision abro-
gates the rule of joint and several liability of concurrent
tortfeasors and establishes in its stead a new rule of 'proportion-
ate liability', under which each concurrent tortfeasor who has
proximately caused an indivisible harm may be held liable only
for a portion of plaintiff's recovery, determined on a compara-
tive fault basis.7
In support of this theory, the AMA argued that after Li, there
was a basis for dividing damages even when an injury was indivisi-
ble, and therefore the underlying rationale for joint and several lia-
bility of concurrent tortfeasors was undermined. The California Su-
preme Court rejected this argument, holding that
the simple feasibility of apportioning fault on a comparative
negligence basis does not render an indivisible injury "divisible"
for purposes of the joint and several liability rule . . . . [A] de-
fendant has no equitable claim vis a vis an injured plaintiff to be
relieved of liability for damage which he has proximately caused
simply because some other tortfeasor's negligence may also have
caused the same harm."
7
The AMA also argued that under comparative negligence,
72. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 67, at 475; see V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 16.4, at 268.
73. Such arguments were advanced by two recent commentators. See Comment, Abro-
gation of Joint and Several Liability: Should Missouri Be Next in Line?, 52 UMKC L. REV.
72 (1983) (authored by Linda K. Knight); Comment, An Analysis of the Proposed Abroga-
lion of California's Joint and Several Liability Doctrine-Is Abrogation the Answer to the
Insurance Industry Crisis?, 8 'WHITTIER L. REV. 263 (1986) (authored by Jay M.
Tenenbaum).
74. 20 Cal.3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
75. 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
76. American Motorcycle, 20 CaI.3d at 585-86, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
77. Id. at 588-89, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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plaintiffs who are allowed recovery are no longer always innocent.
The court acknowledged this point, but distinguished between a
plaintiff's negligence, which is a lack of care for oneself, and a de-
fendant's, which is a lack of care for others. The court offered this
point to justify the allocation of the risk of an insolvent judgment
debtor to the defendants rather than to the plaintiff.7 8 Finally, the
court indicated its real justification for retention of joint and several
liability within the context of comparative negligence:
[W]e think that AMA's suggested abandonment of the
joint and several liability rule would work a serious and unwar-
ranted deleterious effect on the practical ability of negligently
injured persons to receive adequate compensation for their inju-
ries. One of the principle by-products of the joint and several
liability rule is that it frequently permits an injured person to
obtain full recovery . . . even when one or more of the responsi-
ble parties do not have the financial resources to cover their
liability."
Thus, in the name of providing adequate compensation to negligently
injured persons, the California Supreme Court applied an analysis of
the joint and several liability rule based upon its foundation in tradi-
tional concepts of causation to justify its retention. The same policy
underlying the court's innovative break from the traditional contrib-
utory negligence rule only three years earlier in Li was asserted in
American Motorcycle to justify that judicial inertia known as stare
decisis with respect to joint and several liability. The fairness of ade-
quate compensation for a "negligently injured person" appears to
have been to a large extent assumed.80 Interestingly, the people of
California have recently modified the joint and several liability rule
78. Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The court in American Motorcy-
cle apparently felt that it was faced with a choice between allocating the risk of an insolvent
judgment debtor either to plaintiffs, through adoption of the AMA's "proportionate liability"
theory, or to the defendants as a group, through retention of the joint and several liability rule.
The court's justification of the latter approach, based in part upon a characterization of a
plaintiff's negligence as less culpable in kind than that of a defendant, is highly questionable.
One must wonder whether such a characterization truly comports with what a jury is measur-
ing when it looks at the conduct of the parties to an accident and assigns to each a numerical
value representing the comparative responsibility of each for the plaintiff's harm.
79. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
80. The "fairness" of allocating to the defendants the risk that a judgment debtor would
turn out to be judgment-proof was based upon the court's questionable distinction between a
plaintiff's culpability and that of a defendant. See supra note 78. The joint and several liability
rule would operate within California's system of "pure" comparative negligence, after the
American Motorcycle decision, in holding minimally culpable defendants liable for a more
negligent plaintiff's entire award, much as the rule presently does in Pennsylvania's "modified/
aggregate rule" system.
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by referendum.81
The American Motorcycle case exemplifies the majority ap-
proach. The courts of several other states have indicated that joint
and several liability for indivisible injuries is retained under compar-
ative negligence. 82 Some states have retained the rule through ex-
press statutory language, 8 as did Pennsylvania.8
2. Abrogation of Joint and Several Liability-The "Propor-
tionate" Liability Rule.-There is a growing trend toward the abro-
gation of the joint and several liability rule;8'5 where wholly abro-
gated, the rule is replaced by the "proportionate" liability rule.'
Under "proportionate" liability, a defendant's liability is limited to
that portion of the plaintiff's award which corresponds to the defend-
ant's portion of the fault contributing to the plaintiff's injury.8" With
respect to the allocation of the risk that a party will have to bear loss
that is not in proportion to his relative fault, proportionate liability is
the precise opposite of joint and several liability.8 8 Under proportion-
ate liability, the plaintiff will always bear this risk, even when wholly
innocent.
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico advanced a persuasive
argument for the adoption of proportionate liability in Bartlett v.
New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.89 In a case arising from an auto-
mobile accident caused by the defendant and an unknown party who
was not before the court, the question of whether joint and several
liability would be retained under New Mexico's system of "pure"
81. California voters passed Proposition 51, which will eliminate joint and several liabil-
ity for noneconomic damages, on June 3, 1986, by a margin of sixty-two percent to thirty-eight
percent. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. v. Edrington, 259 Ark. 600, 535 S.W.2d 225
(1976); Dunham v. Kampman, 37 Colo. App. 233, 547 P.2d 263 (1975), affd, 192 Colo. 448,
560 P.2d 91 (1977); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979); Seattle
First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d'1308 (1978); Bradley
v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979); Bielski v. Schulze, 16
Wis. 2d I, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
83. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-803(4) (1979). Two states that formerly provided for
joint and several liability by express statutory language are Utah and Wyoming. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(3) (repealed 1986); WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986).
84. See supra note 14.
85. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra'note 3, § 16.4, at 258; see also supra note 83.
86. Some commentators refer to the proportionate liability rule as "several" liability.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 73.
87. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 67, at 475.
88. Joint and several liability allocates this risk to the defendants. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
89. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648
P.2d 794 (1982).
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comparative negligence was answered in the negative. 90 The court
held that "the retention of joint and several liability ultimately rests
on two grounds; neither ground is defensible."9
First, the court rejected the American Motorcycle holding that
comparative negligence does not make an indivisible injury divisible.
"We are unwilling," the court wrote, "to say that although fault
may be apportioned, causation cannot. If the jury can do one, it can
do the other." 2 To say that causation is capable of apportionment is
not technically correct. Dean Prosser noted that "[c]ausation in fact
is an absolute concept, which by its nature is incapable of being di-
vided into comparative degrees-it either exists or it does not."9 Le-
gal or proximate cause, however, is in essence a policy determination
and "may be susceptible to proportionate division."94 The Bartlett
court recognized that comparative fault provides a foundation upon
which apportionment of accident losses can be based.
The second ground upon which retention of joint and several
liability is based, according to the Bartlett court, is the policy which
requires that liability rules should "favor plaintiffs." '95 The court
flatly rejected this policy, adopting instead what it found to be the
90. The Bartlett decision established not only that concurrent tortfeasors would not be
subject to joint and several liability, but also that the loss attributable by comparative fault
principles to an absent tortfeasor would be borne by the claimant. Clearly, this approach sub-
ordinates the goal of compensation to a concept of fairness which requires that a defendant's
liability be limited to a share of the loss corresponding to his or her percentage of negligence.
See supra note 67.
91. Id. at -, 646 P.2d at 584.
92. Id. at -, 646 P.2d at 585.
93. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 67, at 474.
94. Id.; see also Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalvin, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under
Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343 (1980).
95. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at - , 646 P.2d at 585. The same proposition was offered in
American Motorcycle, except that instead of referring to claimants as "plaintiffs," the court
used the words "negligently injured persons." American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal.3d 578, 590, 578 P.2d 899, 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 (1978). The emotive value of
the language chosen by each court is significant. The California court in American Motorcy-
cle, which announced a policy favoring compensation, attempted to justify this policy by char-
acterizing defendants as more culpable than plaintiffs, regardless of their comparative fault as
determined by the trier of fact. See supra note 78. The New Mexico court in Bartlett, using
the neutral term "plaintiff," was embracing the idea that fairness requires liability to be lim-
ited to responsibility, as determined by comparative fault. The court saw no merit in the argu-
ment that a plaintiff should not bear the risk of being unable to collect his judgment. "Between
one plaintiff and one defendant," the court reasoned, "the plaintiff bears the risk of the de-
fendant being insolvent: on what basis does the risk shift if there are two defendants, and one
is insolvent?" Bartlett, 98 N.M. at __ , 646 P.2d at 585; see also Elder v. Orluck, - Pa.
- - 515 A.2d 517, 526 (1986) (Flaherty, J., concurring) ("Justice Larsen might lead
the reader to an impression that 'modern notions of fault and liability' require that the instant
statutes be construed in a manner favorable to plaintiffs. Such is not the case. The purpose of
law should be and is to achieve equality and fairness irrespective of whether a party is a
plaintiff or a defendant.").
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policy upon which "pure" comparative negligence is founded: the ap-
portionment of liability in direct proportion to fault.96 The court held
that concurrent tortfeasors would not be jointly and severally liable;
instead, liability would be measured by reference to relative fault.
The chief difference between the American Motorcycle and
Bartlett decisions, and in essence between jurisdictions retaining
joint and several liability and those replacing it with proportionate
liability, is the extent to which each values the policy favoring ade-
quate compensation for accident victims. Retention of joint and sev-
eral liability allocates to defendants the risk that one of them will be
unable to contribute his proportionate share toward payment of
plaintiff's damages. This approach is taken by those jurisdictions
which value compensation to the extent that they reject the idea that
"fairness" is equivalent to limiting liability of defendants to that por-
tion of the plaintiff's award directly corresponding to the relative
fault of each. Traditional concepts of proximate cause allocate the
risk of disproportionate loss to each defendant. On the other hand,
proportionate liability allocates to the plaintiff the risk that one or
more of the defendants will be unable to satisfy his proportionate
share of the damage award. This approach is favored by those juris-
dictions which have embraced the idea that fairness is equivalent to
limiting a defendant's liability to that portion of the damage award
directly corresponding to his or her percentage of fault and have sub-
ordinated the policy favoring adequate compensation to the pursuit
of fairness thus defined.
Both approaches take a narrow view of the possibilities for an
allocation of the risk of bearing loss that is disproportionate to rela-
tive fault. Some jurisdictions, however, have recognized that the allo-
cation of this risk to either the defendants in every case, or to the
plaintiffs in every case, is unnecessary.
3. Compromise Approaches.-A number of jurisdictions have
modified the operation of the joint and several liability rule within
their particular systems of comparative negligence. Several modified
approaches have been devised by the courts and legislatures.
Oklahoma first abrogated joint and several liability by judicial
decision,9 7 then limited this ruling by retaining joint and several lia-
bility when the plaintiff was without fault.98 The logic of this ap-
96. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at -, 646 P.2d at 583.
97. See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
98. See Anderson v. O'Donoghue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983); Barry v. Empire Indem.
Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 718 (Okla. 1981); Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613
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proach is appealing. To abrogate joint and several liability in the
case of the faultless plaintiff would place such persons in a worse
position, with respect to the likelihood of receiving adequate compen-
sation, under comparative negligence than under contributory
negligence."
Louisiana, Nevada, Oregon, and Texas have adopted an innova-
tive approach to modification of joint and several liability within
comparative negligence. In these states, a defendant is jointly and
severally liable only if his relative fault exceeds that of the plaintiff;
otherwise, the defendant is liable only for a portion of the award
corresponding to his percentage of fault.'00 In effect, this approach
compares the fault of the plaintiff to that of each defendant and
then, in each instance of comparison, allocates to the more culpable
party the risk of bearing a loss that is disproportionate to relative
fault in the event that a defendant is insolvent.
For the sake of illustration, consider the factual scenario of
Elder v. Orluck.'0' Plaintiff was found twenty-five percent negligent,
the first defendant, Orluck, was found sixty percent negligent, and
the second defendant, the Borough of Harrisville, was found fifteen
percent negligent. Under the Louisiana rule, Orluck would have
been subject to joint and several liability, and, in the improbable
event that Harrisville would be unable to pay its award, Orluck
would ultimately bear responsibility for the loss represented by Har-
risville's share of the award. Realistically, the plaintiff would bear
any loss for which he himself was responsible and additionally
whatever portion of the loss for which Orluck was responsible and
unable to compensate him. Since, as between Harrisville and the
plaintiff, the plaintiff was for the most part to blame for his own loss,
(Okla. 1980). In limiting the abrogation of joint and several liability effected by Laubach, the
Boyles court held that
[tihe common-law negligence liability concept may be described as "all or
nothing" to the plaintiff. If he be blame-free, "all" is due him; if he be at fault,
however slightly, "nothing" is his due. The statutory comparative negligence ap-
proach allows the victim at fault to secure some, but not all, of his damages. The
raison detre and rationale of comparative negligence are tied, hand-and-foot, to
the narrow parameters of a blameworthy plaintiff's claim. We hold that neither
the rationale nor the holding of Laubach applies to that class of negligence liti-
gation in which the plaintiff is not one among several negligent co-actors.
619 P.2d at 616 (emphasis in original).
99. See Pearson, supra note 94, at 364.
100. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3)
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1983); TEX. Civ. PRACT. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013
(Vernon 1986).
101. - Pa. -_, 515 A.2d 517 (1986) (discussed supra notes 7-22 and accompany-
ing text).
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Harrisville's liability would be limited to its proportionate share of
the award. Assuming Harrisville was able to compensate the plaintiff
for its fifteen percent share of the loss, the plaintiff would recover
this amount plus whatever Orluck was able to pay.
The Louisiana rule is especially appropriate in systems of modi-
fied comparative negligence. By definition, such systems have not
wholly embraced the idea that fairness requires losses to be appor-
tioned in a manner strictly corresponding to percentages of relative
fault. 102 The parties to the accident who bear greatest responsibility
bear the risk of disproportionate loss. The adoption of this approach
might be just the bit of legislative fine-tuning Pennsylvania's com-
parative negligence system needs in order to prevent the inequity in-
herent in cases such as Elder.
Iowa has carried the Louisiana rule a step further. There, joint
and several liability is imposed upon a defendant only when he or
she is found to bear fifty percent or more of the fault assigned to all
parties.' 03
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) 04 proposes that
joint and several liability be retained and that, in the event a judg-
ment debtor is unable to contribute his proportionate share toward
satisfaction of the award, the uncollectible amount be reallocated
among the parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their
respective percentages at fault. 0 5 This approach splits the risk of
disproportionate loss among all parties whose fault contributed to the
accident.106 Minnesota has adopted the UCFA approach."'7
As noted above, California has recently modified the retention
of joint and several liability announced in American Motorcycle by
referendum. 08 California now retains joint and several liability of
concurrent tortfeasors only for that portion of a plaintiff's damage
award representing compensation for economic loss.' 09 Defendants
102. See supra note 60.
103. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West Supp. 1986).
104. 12 U.L.A. 38-47 (Supp. 1986).
105. Id. § 2(d), at 41.
106. Id. The virtue of the risk splitting approach is that it "avoids the unfairness both of
the common law rule of joint-and-several liability, which would cast the total risk of uncollecti-
bility upon the solvent defendants, and of a rule abolishing joint-and-several liability, which
would cast the total risk of uncollectibility upon the claimant." Id. § 2 commentary at 42.
107. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(l) (West Supp. 1986). Interestingly, Minnesota
has applied the UCFA risk splitting approach to its "greater fault bar" system of comparative
negligence. The UCFA proposes a "pure" comparative negligence system. See supra notes 56-
57 and accompanying text.
108. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1431.1-.5 (West Supp. 1986).
109. "Economic loss" means objectively verifiable pecuniary loss and may include such
items as burial costs, medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of property, and similar
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are proportionately liable for any portion of plaintiff's damage award
representing compensation for noneconomic harm, such as pain and
suffering. This innovative approach attempts to assure adequate
compensation for those elements of harm that will, absent such com-
pensation, cause economic displacement of the victim."' The plain-
tiff bears a risk, however, that some portion of his award represent-
ing, at least theoretically, compensation for pain will be
uncollectible."'
D. Legislative Proposals to Abrogate or Modify the Joint and Sev-
eral Liability Rule in Pennsylvania
The insurance crisis" 2 with which America is faced has given
rise to a popular cry for reform of the civil justice system. Pennsylva-
nia legislators have responded by introducing a number of bills, sev-
eral of which propose to change the rule of joint and several liability,
either generally throughout the civil justice system or in specific con-
texts such as medical malpractice, products liability, and governmen-
tal liability. These bills are briefly described below.
expenses. See infra note I10.
110. Economic losses, if left uncompensated, will cause the average accident victim to be
displaced economically, that is, they will cause the victim financial hardship and diminish his
or her standard of living. This is not true, of course, for victims with assets sufficient to absorb
such costs without hardship, nor is this true for individuals who are insured sufficiently. The
assumption appears to be, however, that most victims are not rich and are not insured suffi-
ciently to bear accident losses without hardship. Economic losses, therefore, must be compen-
sated. Thus, the people of California have modified their definition of "adequate" compensa-
tion. Theoretically, the California approach is attractive and represents a balance between
goals of corrective justice and distributive justice. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying
text. The extent to which the segregation of economic and noneconomic losses will prevent
economic displacement, however, is problematic. See infra note I II.
I l. In theory, awards for pain and suffering, and other noneconomic losses such as
humiliation and injury to reputation, compensate for such harms. Since money cannot erase
the fact that such harms have been suffered, it is clear that such awards are a substitutive
remedy that attempts to "make the plaintiff whole" in some metaphoric sense. To a large
extent, such awards serve goals of corrective justice. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying
text. In practice, awards for noneconomic harm more or less offset the cost to the plaintiff of
obtaining adequate compensation for economic losses, that is, attorney's contingent fees, and
the like. To the extent that the California approach will result in a plaintiff's inability to
collect some portion of his or her noneconomic damage award, therefore, it may fail to prevent
economic displacement.
112. The author uses the term as it is commonly understood, to mean the present
problems of affordability and availability of liability insurance. While some would argue that
trends toward more litigation and larger awards in the civil justice system are the cause of this
crisis, others reject this suggestion and place the blame upon the insurance industry. See IN-
SURANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5. The author embraces neither view. It is submit-
ted that a problem of concurrent causation exists here, and that the legislature should appor-
tion responsibility between the insurance industry and the civil justice system rather than place
blame wholly on either. Tort reform combined with regulation of insurance would be the better
reasoned approach to dealing with the insurance crisis.
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1. General Tort Reform-House Bill 2426.-House Bill
2426113 envisages a broad range of pro-defense changes in the civil
justice system. The issue of joint and several liability is addressed in
the context of the bill's proposal of significant changes in Pennsylva-
nia's system of comparative negligence."' The bill would wholly ab-
rogate the joint and several liability rule, replacing it with propor-
tionate liability." 5
2. Products Liability-House Bill 2425.-House Bill 2425118
proposes a number of pro-defense changes in Pennsylvania's law of
products liability. This bill would abrogate joint and several liability
in the limited context of product liability actions, replacing the rule
with proportionate liability.117 The bill raises an interesting question:
Would defendants sued on a theory of negligence be encouraged by
such a law to implead sellers and manufacturers of products in order
to escape joint and several liability?" 8
113. H.B. 2426, 170th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Sess. (Printer's No. 3388).
114. H.B. 2426 would also provide guidelines for attorney fees, admissibility of evidence
of collateral sources of compensation, the reduction of future damage awards to present worth,
caps on awards for noneconomic loss, and a variety of other tort reform measures.
115. The relevant language of H.B. 2426 reads as follows:
§ 7105. Apportionment of responsibility.
(a) Apportionment of responsibility among defendants.-Where recovery is
allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable only for
that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of
the amount of his causal contribution to injury attributed to all defendants. The
court shall enter separate, several judgments in favor of the plaintiff, and against
each defendant against whom recovery is allowed, only for the amount for which
that defendant is liable. The doctrines of joint and several liability, contribution,
and indemnity shall not be applicable to this section, but nothing in this section
shall limit the right of a person who is found vicariously liable for the acts of
another from asserting a claim for contribution or indemnity against any other
person.
Id. § 7105(a), at 9-10. Subsequent subsections of the bill provide for application of "pure"
comparative responsibility to strict liability claims, apparently leaving modified comparative
negligence principles intact for negligence actions in which no defendants are liable on a the-
ory of strict liability. The bill also provides for apportionment of responsibility to absent
tortfeasors. Thus, the bill is heavily pro-defense. It would allocate to the plaintiff not only the
risk that a judgment debtor will prove insolvent, but also the loss represented by an absent
tortfeasor's share of responsibility. See id. § 7105(b)-(d), at 10- I.
116. H.B. 2425, 170th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Sess. (Printer's No. 3387).
117. The relevant language of H.B. 2425 reads as follows:
(c) Proportional liability of multiple defendants.-Each defendant shall be
liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in
the ratio of his responsibility to the amount of responsibility attributed to all
others.
Id. § 8374, at 14.
118. Since joint and several liability would remain the rule in cases not involving prod-
ucts liability, defendant in non-product actions would apparently have an incentive to implead
products manufacturers or sellers, if a cause of action is imaginable against such party, in
order to bring the whole action within the proportionate liability rule.
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3. Medical Malpractice-House Bills 2230 and
2391.-House Bill 2230119 apparently would abrogate joint and sev-
eral liability in medical malpractice actions. This bill would enact a
rule of proportionate liability.
120
House Bill 2391,121 another medical malpractice bill, would re-
tain joint and several liability and enact a risk splitting rule similar
to that proposed by the UCFA.122 The bill's risk splitting provision
differs in one significant way from that proposed in the UCFA: the
plaintiff would be excluded from reallocation of the uncollectible
amount.
a12
4. Governmental Liability-House Bill 2814.-House Bill
119. H.B. 2230, 170th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Sess. (Printer's No. 3070).
120. The language of H.B. 2230 is somewhat obscure on the issue of joint and several
liability. It reads as follows:
(e) In a medical negligence action the award made against any single de-
fendant shall only be that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as dam-
ages in ratio to the amount of the defendant's personal liability. In no event shall
a defendant be required to make payment in excess of that defendant's pro rata
share of an award.
Id. § 207(A)(e), at 15. The first sentence of this passage, taken alone, is relatively clear. If
"defendant's personal liability" means his percentage of fault, the sentence would appear to
propose proportionate liability. The second sentence is less clear. If one assumes that "pro rata
share" refers to a portion of the award corresponding to a percentage of fault, the sentence is a
redundancy. If "pro rata share" refers to an equal division, as the term does in the PaCATA,
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8324 (Purdon 1982), see Lasprogata v. Quails, 263 Pa. Super. 174,
397 A.2d 803 (1979), this second sentence, read in conjunction with the first, would lead to
absurd results. One can imagine scenarios in which a defendant would not be required to pay
the entire award made against him. The drafters of this bill probably meant to propose propor-
tionate liability.
121. H.B. 2391, 170th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Sess. (Printer's No. 3322).
122. The relevant language in H.B. 2391 reads as follows:
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in
accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction, and enter judgment
against each party liable on the basis of rules of joint and several liability. For
purposes of contribution, the court shall also determine, and state in the judg-
ment, each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accor-
dance with the respective percentages of fault.
(d) Upon motion made not later than one year after a final judgment is
entered, the court shall determine whether all or a part of a party's equitable
share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, excluding a claimant at fault,
according to their respective percentages of fault. The party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability
to the claimant on the judgment.
Id., § 1210(c), (d), at 36.
123. This bill proposes risk splitting only among defendants, rather than among all par-
ties, as does the UCFA. Thus, it wholly retains the benefits of joint and several liability for the
plaintiff. Depending on how many defendants are held jointly and severally liable, and on the
range of percentages of negligence assigned to members of the defendant group, this provision
would to some extent diminish the risk that a defendant will bear a loss that is grossly dispro-
portionate to his relative fault.
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2814124 would exempt Commonwealth parties125 and local agen-
cies 126 from joint and several liability when their percentage of fault
is equal to or less than that of the claimant and is equal to or less
than fifty percent of all negligence attributed to defendants as a
group.127 This approach is a combination of the Louisiana rule and a
modified Iowa rule.1
28
At the time of this writing, only three days remained in the
1986 session. No significant action was taken on any of these tort
reform proposals within this period. Tort reform, however, is an issue
which is still alive, and some, if not all, of the legislative proposals
described above are likely to be reintroduced.' 29
IV. Pennsylvania's Choice: Retention, Abrogation, or Modification
of Joint and Several Liability
Should Pennsylvania retain its present rule of joint and several
liability? If not, what change is most desirable? The answers to
these questions should ideally rest upon a careful examination of the
function of joint and several liability and the prospective functions of
its various alternatives within Pennsylvania's present system of han-
dling loss apportionment in cases involving multiple defendants.
Function must be evaluated with reference to the various goals of
124. H.B. 2814, 170th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Sess. (Printer's No. 4059).
125. "Commonwealth parties" include "Commonwealth agenclies] or any other agency
of the Commonwealth government and any employee thereof, but only with respect to an act
within the scope of his office or employment." Id. § 8501, at 2. "Commonwealth agencies"
include almost any executive officer, administrative department, board or commission, or entity
of the state government. See id. § 8501, at 1-2.
126. "Local agency" means a government unit other than a Commonwealth party, such
as an intermediate unit, local authority, municipal authority, and the like. Id. § 8501, at 3.
127. The relevant language in H.B. 2814 reads as follows:
(d) Contribution-Where damages are recoverable against parties to an ac-
tion in addition to the Commonwealth party, notwithstanding the provisions of
section 7102 (relating to comparative negligence), unless the Commonwealth
party is substantially at fault, the Commonwealth party shall be liable only for
that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the
amount of the Commonwealth party's causal negligence to the amount of causal
negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The
Commonwealth party shall be deemed substantially at fault only if the causal
negligence of the Commonwealth party exceeds the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff and only if the ratio of the Commonwealth party's causal negligence
to the amount of causal negligence of all defendants against whom recovery is
allowed exceeds 50%.
Id. § 8529(d), at 17. Section 8553(d) is identical, except that "local agency" is substituted for
"Commonwealth party" at the appropriate places.
128. See supra notes 100, 103 and accompanying text.
129. Interview with Mary R. Woolley, Counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives, in Harrisburg, Pa., (Nov. 14, 1986).
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our evolving system of accident law.1 30 In the most general terms,
these goals may be segregated, for conceptual purposes, into two cat-
egories-goals of corrective justice and goals of distributive justice.
Corrective justice concentrates on the litigant parties, with the
goal of restoring or maintaining a given equilibrium. 3' This cate-
gory of goals reflects the genesis of the law of torts. The equilibrium
with which the early law of torts was concerned, and with which the
law of accidents to some extent remains concerned, is based upon a
concept of fairness between parties to an event that causes injury.
The courts sought this equilibrium to provide an alternative to indi-
vidual acts of vengeance, and to promote order and the peaceful res-
olution of disputes; 32 thus, "the blameworthy injurer must compen-
sate the innocent victim."' 33
Distributive justice, as distinguished from corrective justice,
transcends the mutual relationship between litigant parties "by link-
ing it to the totality of society. The situation of the individual would
be measured against the collectivity's resources and judged accord-
ingly."' 34 In more recent times, goals of distributive justice have in-
creased in importance. The increasing number of accidents that ac-
companied the industrialization of American society "created social
pressure for the compensation of . . .victim[s]"' 135 when traditional
fault concepts would have left the victims to bear their losses without
compensation. As a result, the idea of moral culpability was weak-
ened through the objectification of the elements of fault and causa-
tion,' 3 thus making compensation through the tort law system more
readily available. In order to distribute the cost of compensation, lia-
bility insurance came into use." 7 The compensation goal that devel-
oped is largely distributive in nature. 3 8
130. For a discussion of the development of principles of apportionment of loss through
comparative fault, see supra notes 35-67 and accompanying text.
131. Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 27 n.2 (1980).
132. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 4, at 21-22.
133. Englard, supra note 131, at 27. While there is some dispute as to whether the
moral aspect of a defendant's conduct was from the beginning a central concern in assessing
liability, "the law has moved forward toward the recognition of moral responsibility as one
basis of remedy, and at least partial identification of tort liability with the immoral conduct
which would not be expected of a good citizen." PROSSER, supra note 4, § 4, at 22.
134. Englard, supra note 131, at 27 n.2.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id.; see also R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM 244-47 (1965).
137. Englard, supra note 131, at 28.
138. The corrective justice notion that a blameworthy injurer must compensate his inno-
cent victim has been to some extent relaxed by the fact that the law permits faulty parties to
distribute loss through liability insurance. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 2.
JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY
Some legal scholars deemed compensation of victims the preem-
inent concern in the law of accidents and suggested that the fault-
oriented system of tort law should be invalidated in favor of a system
of compensation through social insurance.139 Under such a system,
the cost of compensating victims of accidents, once the accidents had
occurred, would be distributed broadly, thus minimizing the post-
accident economic losses to be borne by any individual. "1 0 Other the-
orists suggest that the goal of distributing post-accident costs should
be balanced against other distributive goals of the accident law sys-
tem, such as the deterrence of conduct likely to cause accidents, in
order to minimize the overall economic costs of accidents. " "
A balance must be sought because the goals of deterrence and
post-accident cost minimization conflict; concentration of loss pro-
motes deterrence," 2 while distribution of loss minimizes post-acci-
dent compensation costs." 3 The key to balancing these approaches is
the pricing of insurance coverage in accordance with expected
loss."' When society makes collective decisions regarding rules of
tort law, the distributive goal of accident cost reduction and the cor-
rective goal of seeking fairness between litigant parties should be
139. Most notable among these proponents of compensation-oriented accident law was
Fleming James. "James saw accidents as inevitable consequences of productive activity, and he
conceived the principle function of tort law to be, not the resolution of disputes, rule definition,
or the expression of moral values, but compensation of the injured." Priest, supra note 2, at
470.
140. Such a system is appealing in that the costs of productive activity would be borne
by the collectivity that benefits from it. The adoption of such a system would, of course, mark
a radical departure from traditional tort law. New Zealand has adopted such a system; tort
law has been abolished insofar as it deals with accidental injuries. A broad plan of social
insurance provides compensation to the victims of accidents. For a brief overview of the New
Zealand approach, see P. ATIYAH. ACCIDENTS. COMPENSATION, AND THE LAW 564-66 (2nd ed.
1975).
141. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 2. Calabresi proposes a framework for the analysis
of accident law with a view toward the reduction of the overall costs of accidents in society. He
identifies three subgoals: primary accident cost reduction (the reduction of the number and
severity of accidents through deterrence achieved either through collective prohibition of con-
duct or the "market" effect of liability rules upon individual conduct), secondary cost reduc-
tion (the reduction of the cost of compensating victims after an accident has occurred, through
devices of loss-distribution) and tertiary cost reduction (the reduction of "administrative" costs
attending the pursuit of both primary and secondary cost reduction). Id. at 26-31. For a criti-
cal analysis of Calabresi's approach, see Englard, supra note 131, at 33-51.
142. By concentrating loss upon the party who causes it, the accident costs generated by
particular activities are internalized and the participants upon whom accident losses are con-
centrated are encouraged to engage in loss prevention. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 73-
75.
143. While any particular accident loss may represent a relatively constant dollar
amount, whether or not it is distributed, the economic displacement caused by concentration of
loss will vary by (I) where it is concentrated and (2) the extent to which it is distributed. See
id. at 37-45.
144. See, K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, 12, 17 (1986); see also G. CALABRESI,
supra note 2.
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considered and balanced.1"5
A. Retention of Joint and Several Liability-Why Not?
The rule of joint and several liability as it applies within Penn-
sylvania's system of comparative negligence has two basic faults.
From the corrective justice standpoint, the rule creates the likelihood
of unfair results. In terms of distributive justice, joint and several
liability frustrates the goal of efficient accident cost reduction.
The way "fairness" is defined is crucial to a corrective justice
analysis.1"" In the discussion above, the author proposed that those
states which have abrogated the rule of joint and several liability
have embraced the idea that fairness is equivalent to limiting the
liability of a defendant to that portion of the plaintiffs loss corre-
sponding to the defendant's percentage of fault. 147 The states retain-
ing joint and several liability have retained the more traditional defi-
nition of fairness, which finds its expression in the rule that a
defendant whose tortious conduct is a substantial cause of the plain-
tiff's injury can be held liable for the plaintiff's entire loss.1"8
Under either definition of fairness, there is manifest injustice in
a system in which a defendant who is found one percent causally
negligent could be compelled to compensate half of a fifty percent
causally negligent plaintiff's loss. 49 This proposition does not reject
the traditional notion of fairness behind the joint and several liability
rule, nor does it necessarily entail an adoption of the notion that
fairness requires a limitation of a defendant's liability to his percent-
age of fault. It merely recognizes that the trier of fact has compared
the culpability of the plaintiff and defendant and has found that, as
between the two, the plaintiff is primarily to blame for his own
loss.150 There is no notion of fairness that will support the imposition
of entire liability upon the defendant who is less negligent than the
145. In reference to the need to balance goals when contemplating a change in the acci-
dent law system, Calabresi argues, not unpersuasively, as follows:
We cannot have all of our goals for accident law perfectly met. This is not
to say, however, that at any given time we may not be able to improve the
existing system in a way that brings us closer to all those goals. To say that the
goals are ultimately inconsistent with one another is far from saying that a
change cannot further all of them somewhat, especially if the change is from a
system that developed haphazardly, with none of the goals specifically in mind.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 94 (emphasis in original).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
147. See supra notes 66-111 and accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text (discussion of the Elder case).
150. See supra note 78.
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plaintiff. The allocation of the risk of disproportionate loss to defend-
ants regardless of relative fault disregards fairness and must rest
upon other grounds.
From the viewpoint of distributive justice, whether joint and
several liability is desirable within Pennsylvania's "greater fault bar/
aggregate rule" system of comparative negligence depends on the
orientation of the analyst. The "deep pockets" effect of joint and
several liability may appeal to those who hold compensation and
post-accident loss distribution to be the preeminent concern.151 On
the other hand, those who believe that tort law should reflect a con-
cern with the efficient allocation of resources with respect to the re-
duction of the costs of accidents would argue that doctrines such as
joint and several liability, which "enable some plaintiffs to recover
from defendants who have not actually caused the loss (or the entire
loss) in question,"'1 2 tend to frustrate the efficiency goal. Under joint
and several liability,
[m]inimally culpable defendants ... [are] held liable for
[all] damages suffered by a victim when, in fact, the injuries
resulted from the combined activities of many other actors. In-
surance premiums will have to take account of this quasi-vicari-
ous liability exposure.
[U]nder such circumstances, the potential imposition on
some [actors] and the concomitant evasion of liability by other-
wise culpable [actors] may tend to distort the premium-setting
process. In fact, the premiums charged all [participants in a cer-
tain activity] may gravitate toward the same level, notwith-
standing significant differences in the safety precautions or oper-
ating procedures of different [actors]. Thus, although [joint and
several liability] may facilitate victim compensation, to the ex-
tent that [it] impose[s] liability out of proportion to the loss
causing potential of each insured, [it] may distort the desired
effects of insurance pricing.1"'
As noted above, an efficient balance between deterrence and loss dis-
tribution depends upon the pricing of insurance to reflect expected
loss. 154 If expected loss includes loss due to the action of others, lia-
bility insurance consumers may make inefficient choices in deciding
how to balance loss prevention activities and risk distribution
through insurance. If, for instance, insurance is overpriced, those
151. See supra note 139.
152. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 144, at 49.
153. Id.
154. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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purchasing insurance may over-allocate resources to loss prevention.
If insurance is underpriced in relation to a particular consumer, the
opposite may occur. 15
The rule of joint and several liability in Pennsylvania does not
reflect a desirable balance of corrective justice, or "fairness" con-
cerns, and distributive justice goals. While the rule promotes the
goal of compensation, it does so at the expense of fairness and
efficiency.
B. The Alternatives
Depending upon the definition of fairness one adopts, propor-
tionate liability, which allocates the risk of disproportionate loss to
the plaintiff, is either desirable or undesirable from the standpoint of
corrective justice. If fairness requires that a defendant's liability be
limited to his percentage of fault, and that a plaintiff should not be
advantaged with respect to collectibility of his award when injured
by two or more defendants rather than one,'" then proportionate
liability may be palatable in terms of corrective justice. If, on the
other hand, fairness requires that the risk of disproportionate loss be
allocated with respect to relative fault, then proportionate liability is
objectionable, since it arbitrarily allocates this risk to plaintiffs. 167
Additionally, one must ask whether the wholly innocent plaintiff
should be worse off under comparative negligence than he was under
the traditional contributory negligence rule.1 8"
While proportionate liability may promote desired effects on in-
surance pricing,'" it does so at the expense of the compensation goal
by allocating to plaintiffs the risk of uncollectibility of damages. It
would appear that some method of distribution of this risk, or per-
haps its allocation by reference to relative fault, is to be preferred.
Both the UCFA risk splitting approach'60 and the Louisiana ap-
proach'"" to the application of joint and several liability within a sys-
tem of comparative negligence balance the corrective justice goals of
achieving a fair result between litigant parties and distributive jus-
155. For a discussion of the pursuit of optimal deterrence, that is, the efficient combina-
tion of loss prevention and risk, see K. ABRAHAM, supra note 144, at 10-18. See also G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 2; cf. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972)
(discussing the economic implications of the fault system of tort law).
156. See supra note 95.
157. See supra note 68.
158. See supra text accompanying note 99.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
160. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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tice goals of efficient compensation and deterrence. Either one is a
desirable alternative to Pennsylvania's present rule of joint and sev-
eral liability.
The idea of using relative percentages of fault to reapportion
among all parties those amounts uncollectible through contribution,
proposed by the UCFA, is attractive in terms of fairness. In this
system, fault determines the extent to which a party will bear a risk
of loss that is not strictly in proportion to relative fault. Proportion is
preserved to the greatest extent practicable. 162 The definition of fair-
ness underlying this approach is more akin to that embraced in sys-
tems of proportionate liability; however, under the UCFA approach,
compensation of the injured party is more highly valued.
The Louisiana approach also uses fault to allocate the risk of
disproportionate loss. The fault of the plaintiff is compared to that of
each defendant, and in each instance of comparison, the risk of a
defendant's insolvency is allocated to the more culpable party. If the
plaintiff's fault is greater than that of each defendant, compensation
is allowed, but the defendants will be liable only for their proportion-
ate share of the plaintiff's allowed recovery. If the plaintiff's fault is
less than that of each defendant, all defendants will be jointly and
severally liable, and each will bear the risk of disproportionate loss.
When the plaintiff's fault is greater than that of one defendant, and
less than that of another, as was the case in Elder,163 the former
defendant will be only proportionately liable, while the latter defend-
ant will be jointly and severally liable and thus bear the risk of dis-
proportionate loss.
Since proportion is not preserved, the Louisiana approach would
appear to be founded upon a definition of fairness that is more con-
gruent to that which underlies modified comparative negligence,
which by definition provides for allocation of loss that is dispropor-
tionate to relative fault when a plaintiff is barred from recovery. 6
Since, under both the UCFA approach and the Louisiana approach,
the risk of disproportionate loss is allocated not arbitrarily to either
plaintiffs or defendants, but rather by reference to relative fault, the
goal of compensation would be promoted to a greater extent than
162. The UCFA approach would preserve proportionate loss not only for defendants, but
also for plaintiffs. In this way it actually is superior to the proportionate liability rule, which,
although keeping defendants' losses in proportion to their responsibility, creates a potential for
disproportionate loss to the plaintiff.
163. See Elder v. Orluck, - Pa. .. 515 A.2d 517 (1986).
164. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
notes 100-02.
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under the proportionate liability rule, and the goal of fairness would
be promoted to a greater extent than under joint and several liabil-
ity.16 5 Finally, through allocation of the risk of disproportionate loss
by reference to relative percentage of fault, each system to some ex-
tent would represent an improvement over joint and several liability
in terms of promoting desirable insurance pricing effects on the bal-
ance of loss prevention and risk distribution.1"
The Iowa approach, 117 which provides for proportionate liability
of a defendant unless he bears at least half of the responsibility for
the plaintiff's loss, represents a balance similar to that of the Louisi-
ana rule. "Fairness" would appear to be articulated in a slightly dif-
ferent way under the Iowa approach: if a defendant is not for the
most part to blame for the plaintiff's loss, he should not bear the risk
of disproportionate loss as a concurrent tortfeasor. The compensation
goal would be promoted to a lesser extent than under the Louisiana
approach, while the economic efficiency goal might be promoted to
an extent greater than under the Louisiana approach, since it is rea-
sonable to expect that the Iowa rule would impose liability in propor-
tion to fault more often than would the Louisiana approach.
As previously mentioned, the California approach, which abol-
ishes joint and several liability for noneconomic damages, appears to
effect a balance between distributive justice concerns of providing
adequate compensation and corrective justice concerns of fairness
between litigant parties."" As did the California Supreme Court in
American Motorcycle,'" the people of California appear to have
subordinated the idea that fairness requires a defendant's liability to
be limited by his or her percentage of fault to the policy favoring
compensation, at least for economic harms. The California rule re-
tains joint and several liability for economic loss and limits a defend-
ant's liability for noneconomic damages to the defendant's propor-
tionate share of such damages. While in theory this approach has its
attractions, whether it will effectively promote its theoretical goals is
questionable.1
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JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY
V. Conclusion
Pennsylvania should not retain the rule of joint and several lia-
bility of concurrently negligent tortfeasors in its traditional form. Al-
though the rule may facilitate the compensation of accident victims,
it operates within Pennsylvania's "aggregate rule" system of modi-
fied comparative negligence to create a likelihood of unfairness to
minimally negligent "deep pocket" defendants. While compensation
of injured persons is of utmost importance in the law of accidents,
justice requires not only compensation, but compensation that is fair.
To be sure, fairness is an amorphous concept, but some things are
clearly unfair. To compel a one percent causally negligent defendant
to compensate half the loss of a fifty percent causally negligent
plaintiff is clearly unfair. Fairness might allow recovery in such a
situation, but surely it does not allow disproportionate liability. This
is true whether the defendant is a government entity, product manu-
facturer, professional, or an average citizen. The goal of fair com-
pensation warrants a general change, not one which protects special
classes of persons or activities.
Furthermore, while incremental tort reform will not cure the in-
surance crisis, some changes in the civil justice system may contrib-
ute to an improvement of the situation. Joint and several liability,
which both encourages suits against "deep pockets" regardless of
whether their negligence is minimal and imposes liability for greater
amounts than would an alternative system, is a prime candidate for
change. Additionally, joint and several liability may frustrate the
goal of economically efficient accident cost reduction.
The proportionate liability rule is equally undesirable, because
it arbitrarily allocates to plaintiffs the risk of disproportionate loss
and thereby frustrates the goal of compensation. Pennsylvania
should choose a middle ground, one that represents a balance of the
goals of compensation, fairness between litigant parties, and the eco-
nomically efficient reduction of the costs of accidents.
R. Michael Lindsey

